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ONE LANGUAGE, MANY REALITIES:1 AN INTERPRETATION OF 
LANGUAGE, LAW, AND SECTION 215(A)(3) OF THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
What do lawyers do?  This question yields a mélange of answers.2  
Nonetheless, the majority of people share “central notions about lawyering: a 
lawyer is a litigator, . . . [one who is] knowledgeable about both legal doctrine 
and procedure,”3 and who “engage[s] in . . . prototypically lawyerly 
endeavor[s].”4  To perform prototypically lawyerly endeavors, such as drafting 
pleadings or arguing motions, lawyers rely on words.  As such, the practice of 
law involves more than rights, obligations, and procedure.5  “The law is a 
profession of words.”6 
Most people, including those in the legal profession, would agree that legal 
language7 tends to be complex or confusing.8  In fact, legal language has been 
characterized as a “specialized tongue”9 and has earned such a designation for 
a handful of reasons.  First, those who draft laws, contracts, and legal 
memoranda regularly employ common words in uncommon ways.10  Second, 
laws and other legal documents often include words that have unfixed or 
flexible meanings.11  Third, legal language tends to be populated by Latin 
words and phrases.12  Additionally, the complexity of legal language is 
 
 1. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE, at xi (2d ed. 2003). 
 2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 
29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555, 555 (1980). 
 3. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 325 (1995). 
 4. Id. at 324. 
 5. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW, at vii (1963). 
 6. Id. 
 7. In this Comment, the phrase “legal language” includes, but is not limited to, laws, 
contracts, leases, pleadings, court orders, and opinions. 
 8. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (“I 
have not encountered a single lawyer, judge, or scholar who views existing case-law as anything 
but a chaos of confused argument which ought to be set right if one only knew how.”); Brandt 
Goldstein, Lost in Translation? Some Brief Notes on Writing About Law for the Layperson, 52 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2008). 
 9. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 11. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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compounded by language itself:13 language is durable, precise, yet temporary 
and inexact.14  America’s English is “as absorbent as a sponge, as flexible as a 
rubber band, and it simply won’t stand still.”15  “Change may be [one of 
English’s] greatest strength[s] . . . .”16  On the other hand, change may be “the 
source of a lot of unnecessary angst[,]”17 particularly when it frustrates a 
principal purpose of language, which is to communicate.18 
The malleability of language together with the hallmarks of legal 
language19 tend to aid and abet litigation.20  If a law is subject to varying 
interpretations by various individuals, “parties having an interest in what is 
meant may . . . ask the court to come up with its interpretation,”21  and the 
court’s interpretation often hinges upon the meaning of a single word.22 
Ambiguous legal language, aside from encouraging litigation, also gives 
rise to an interdisciplinary study: the nexus between language (linguistics) and 
the law.  From this vantage point, a series of questions crystallize.  First, “[t]o 
what extent should we worry about . . . defining words—that is, about . . . 
getting the law right?”23  Second, how is the law to endure if words do not?24  
Third, can communities be governed effectively by vague laws?25  Certain 
 
 13. See id. at 396 (“The language of the law shares the imperfections of the common 
language and of language itself.”). 
 14. See ANATOLY LIBERMAN, WORD ORIGINS . . . AND HOW WE KNOW THEM: 
ETYMOLOGY FOR EVERYONE 191, 250 (2005).  “Words change both their phonetic shape and 
meaning . . . .  This is not a trivial statement.  We understand the oldest people around us and our 
great-grandchildren, and the ease of communication emphasizes the stability of language.  Some 
words appear and disappear in our lifetime . . . .”  Id. at 157. 
 15. PATRICIA T. O’CONNER & STEWART KELLERMAN, ORIGINS OF THE SPECIOUS: MYTHS 
AND MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, at xvi (2009). 
 16. Id. at xvii. 
 17. Id. 
 18. S.-Y. Kuroda, Some Thoughts on the Foundations of the Theory of Language Use, 3 
LINGUISTICS & PHIL., no. 1, 1979 at 1, 3 (1979) (“Language is most commonly considered to be a 
means of communication, to be, in fact, the system of communication par excellence.”). 
 19. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 21. SANFORD SCHANE, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 12 (2006). 
 22. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 397 (“Nowhere else can so much hinge on a word—not 
merely billions of dollars, but weightier intangibles . . . .”); see Frigaliment Importing Co. v. 
B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (interpreting the word 
“chicken”); United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 706 (2d 
Cir. 1934) (interpreting the word “obscene”); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126, 
127–28 (1998) (interpreting the word “carries”). 
 23. Bryan A. Garner, Legal Lexicography: A View from the Front Lines, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 
151, 151 (2003). 
 24. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 437 (“Change the words; you lose the law.”). 
 25. Timothy Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, 7 LEGAL THEORY 379, 379 (2001) 
[hereinafter Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague]. 
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scholars have argued that vague laws have a place in society.26  However, 
imprecise laws displace definite bounds and create uncertainty in places where 
certainty is desired and necessary. 
For instance, vague employment laws can be detrimental to the 
workplace,27 in part, because laws that govern the employer-employee 
relationship “aim to regulate . . . a wide range of personal interactions.”28  In 
fact, data shows that employment law is “‘the fastest growing area of litigation 
in the country.’”29  Legal commentator Walter Olson pins the rise of 
employment litigation on the nature of new employment laws.30  He suggests 
that new employment laws “tend to avoid giving employers definite rules to 
obey but instead lay out sweeping if vague aspirations.”31 
Olson’s characterization of new employment laws resonates with the 
majority’s interpretation of Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“Act”), a statutory regime that is not so new.32  Most courts have construed 
the scope of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision liberally.33  Apparently, 
Olson’s description of new employment laws—they “lay out sweeping if 
vague aspirations”34—is an apt description of old employment laws, too.  
Notwithstanding the majority’s liberal interpretation of the Act’s anti-
retaliation provision, the Seventh Circuit in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp. declined to follow suit.35 
 
 26. See id. (arguing that “precision is not always useful in regulating communities”). 
 27. See Mark A. Rothstein, Serge A. Martinez & W. Paul McKinney, Using Established 
Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
80 WASH. U. L. Q. 243, 244 (2002) (“The vagueness of the definition of ‘individual with a 
disability’ has frustrated employers and other parties responsible for complying with ADA 
requirements.  It has also left individuals uncertain of whether they have standing to ask for the 
reasonable accommodations reserved under the law for individuals with ‘covered’ disabilities.”); 
Disabilities Act Raises Questions for Employers Over Health Insurance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 51, at A–1 (Mar. 16, 1992) (“Many private-sector employers are confused about their health 
insurance obligations under the Americans With Disabilities Act . . . .”). 
 28. See WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY 3 (1997). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Willis J. Nordlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 LAB. L.J. 
715, 721 (1988) (explaining the implementation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which became 
effective on October 24, 1938). 
 33. Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.C.C. 2009) (“The Courts of Appeals for 
the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that an 
informal complaint to an employer can constitute protected activity for purposes of the FLSA.”). 
 34. OLSON, supra note 28, at 3. 
 35. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009), 
(“[W]e believe that the FLSA’s use of the phrase ‘file any complaint’ requires a plaintiff 
employee to submit some sort of writing . . . .”), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), 
and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
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Section 215(a)(3) of the Act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to 
discharge . . . any employee because such employee has filed any complaint.”36  
In Kasten, a former employee desired to invoke the aegis of Section 
215(a)(3).37  The substantive issue presented by this case is whether purely oral 
complaints constitute “filing” a complaint and thereby trigger the Act’s 
protection.38  The lion’s share of the court’s analysis concerned the contours of 
the word “filed.”39  The breadth of the statutory text, “filed any complaint,” 
engendered a circuit split.40  However, the Supreme Court resolved the split on 
March 22, 2011.41 
The judiciary’s interpretation of the word “filed” has inspired the 
following query: Should tribunals, when interpreting the meaning of statutory 
text, be mindful of both linguistic and legal concerns?  This Comment explores 
the ambit of Section 215(a)(3) and examines the implications of the law’s 
relation to language and language’s relation to the law.  Part I provides a brief 
introduction to the Act’s anti-retaliation clause and summarizes the bifurcated 
interpretations of the text “filed any complaint.”  Part II discusses the 
confluence of language and the law and details the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of Section 215(a)(3).  Part III provides an overview of statutory 
construction, surveys the analytical tools employed by lower courts, and 
canvasses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of the Act.  Part IV summarizes 
oral arguments heard by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court’s ruling, and 
considers the implications of the Court’s opinion.  This author argues that the 
Supreme Court should have affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling; by doing so, 
the Court would have preserved a venerable piece of federal legislation and 
resisted the commission of verbicide.42 
 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
 37. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 838–40. 
 40. Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.C.C. 2009). 
There is some disagreement among the circuits whether an informal or internal complaint 
constitutes “any complaint” within the meaning of Section 215(a)(3).  The Courts of 
Appeals for the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
concluded that an informal complaint to an employer can constitute protected activity for 
purposes of the FLSA. . . .  On the other hand, the Second and Fourth Circuits have ruled 
that an informal complaint to an employer is not protected activity under the FLSA. 
Id. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 1999); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., 
Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999); Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549–50 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled by Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 
989–90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 41. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1325, 1335 (2011). 
 42. See infra Part IV.E and note 380 (explaining that verbicide occurs when an entity ignores 
the accepted meaning of a word, thereby weakening its value and clarity). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
The Act endeavors to standardize rules that govern the workforce43 and 
promote fairness at the workplace.44  The Act has three overarching goals: (1) 
to establish minimum wages; (2) to devise a schedule for overtime pay; and (3) 
to eliminate child labor.45  The linchpin of this statutory scheme is its 
“remedial and humanitarian . . . purpose.”46 
Franklin D. Roosevelt characterized the Act as “the most far-reaching, far-
sighted, program for the benefit of workers ever adopted here or in any other 
country.”47  As of late, this piece of legislation furnishes protection to over 130 
million American workers.48  Signed into law in 1938, the Act has been 
amended a handful of times,49 perhaps because it “imposes basic labor 
standards.”50 
A. The Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision 
Section 215(a)(3) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer: 
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because 
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted 
any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to 
testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry 
committee . . . .51 
The Act’s anti-retaliation provision contains three discrete clauses:52 the 
complaint clause,53 the testimony clause,54 and the industry committee 
 
 43. Nordlund, supra note 32, at 720–21. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 6–7, 12, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062–
63, 1067; E. Merrick Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941–1945, 59 
HARV. L. REV. 321, 321 (1946). 
 46. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944). 
 47. Nordlund, supra note 32, at 715. 
 48. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #14: COVERAGE UNDER THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) 1 (July 2009), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/ 
whdfs14.pdf. 
 49. Nordlund, supra note 32, at 724. 
 50. Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
 52. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
Specifically, § 215(a)(3) prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions 
against employees who assert their FLSA rights in three enumerated ways.  Thus, 
employees trigger the anti-retaliation provision when they have either: (1) “filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceedings” under the FLSA; (2) 
“testified or is about to testify in any [FLSA] proceeding”; or (3) “served or is about to 
serve on an industry committee”. 
Id. 
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clause.55  Judicial intervention is triggered if an employee files any complaint, 
testifies or will testify in a proceeding, or has served or will serve on an 
industry committee.56  Accordingly, to present a claim of retaliation under 
Section 215(a)(3), an employee must have engaged in one of the provision’s 
enumerated categories of protected conduct.57 
Section 215(a)(3) of the Act provides a safe harbor for employees who 
report an employer’s violation of the Act.58  In addition to encouraging 
employee reporting, Section 215(a)(3) doubles as an enforcement mechanism59 
since “Congress did not seek to secure compliance with [the Act’s] standards 
through continuing detailed federal supervision . . . .  Rather it chose to rely on 
information and complaints received from employees . . . .”60  As such, the Act 
serves its purpose only if “employees fe[el] free to approach officials [and 
supervisors] with their grievances.”61 
B. The Act’s Complaint Clause 
The Act’s complaint clause, which has garnered judicial attention for 
years,62 prohibits adverse employment action against an employee who has 
“filed any complaint.”63  Courts across the country have interpreted the reach 
of this statutory text.64  Most lower courts have prioritized form over 
substance;65 that is, they gloss over the content of the complaint and focus 
more on its delivery.66  To determine whether Section 215(a)(3) applies to the 
parties’ dispute, lower courts have addressed two recurring issues: one 
 
 53. Minor, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 436. (“[T]he ‘complaint clause’ . . . proscribes discharge of an 
employee who ‘has filed any complaint or instituted . . . any proceeding’ related to the 
FLSA . . . .”). 
 54. Id. (“[T]he ‘testimony clause’ . . . forbids dismissal of an employee who ‘has testified or 
is about to testify in any . . . proceeding’ under or related to the FLSA.”). 
 55. See Sandt v. Holden, 698 F. Supp. 64, 68–69 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (discussing the third 
clause of Section 215(a)(3): serving on an industry committee). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006); Sandt, 698 F. Supp. at 68. 
 57. O’Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 664 (“Thus, unless the conduct claimed to be the trigger for the 
retaliatory act falls within one of the three specified protected activity categories, the provision 
does not apply and there is no actionable retaliation under the FLSA.”). 
 58. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
 59. Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1550 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 60. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 63. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
 64. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 65. Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 535, 541 (2001) (“The basic issue over which the circuits disagree is the degree of 
formality with which an employee must complain to be engaging in statutorily protected 
activity.”); see, e.g., Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 66. Clemons, supra note 65, at 541. 
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concerns the phrase “any complaint,” and the other relates to the meaning of 
the word “filed.”67  With respect to the phrase “any complaint,” there is some 
inconsistency among courts about whether an internal complaint constitutes 
protected activity.68  However, most circuits agree that intra-corporate 
complaints trigger the protection of Section 215(a)(3).69 
Unlike the more settled analysis of the text “any complaint,” the meaning 
of the word “filed” has produced conflicting interpretations, namely because 
courts disagree about the character of formality required by the statute’s 
language.70  Some courts have held that purely oral complaints satisfy the 
language of the statute.71  Such circuits champion a liberal construction of the 
verb “filed”72 and have reasoned that the phrase “filed any complaint” is 
susceptible to differing interpretations.73  These circuits, when analyzing the 
ambit of Section 215(a)(3), have deferred to the statute’s “remedial and 
humanitarian . . . purpose.”74  Thus, the statute’s ambiguous language in 
conjunction with the Act’s remedial purpose have convinced a number of 
courts that Section 215(a)(3) of the Act is entitled to a broad interpretation.75 
Conversely, courts that have conferred a narrow interpretation on the Act’s 
anti-retaliation clause have concluded that the language of the “provision could 
scarcely be clearer.”76  A Virginia court explained: “[Section 215(a)(3) of the 
Act] defines in clear and unambiguous language three specific categories of 
 
 67. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838–40 (7th 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 68. See infra note 69. 
 69. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838 (finding that the language of Section 215(a)(3) includes internal 
corporate complaints); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 625–26 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(stating that internal corporate complaints are covered under the Act’s anti-retaliation provision).  
But see Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that internal 
complaints filed by employees do not constitute protected activity.); Minor v. Bostwick Labs., 
Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that “intra-company complaints made by 
an employee to her supervisors” do not trigger the protection of the Act’s anti-retaliation clause). 
 70. Jennifer Lynne Redmond, Are You Breaking Some Sort of Law?: Protecting an 
Employee’s Informal Complaints Under the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Anti-Retaliation 
Provision, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 325 (2000). 
 71. Id. at 325 n.44. 
 72. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 73. See id. at 1004. 
 74. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944). 
 75. Id. (“But these provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, are 
remedial and humanitarian in purpose. . . .  Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a 
narrow, grudging manner.”); Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“Moreover, ‘the remedial nature of the statute further warrants an expansive interpretation of its 
provisions . . . .’”); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The Fair Labor 
Standards Act is part of the large body of humanitarian and remedial legislation enacted during 
the Great Depression, and has been liberally interpreted.”); Clemons, supra note 65, at 553. 
 76. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1290 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1283 
conduct for which retaliation is prohibited.  And it does so in terms that make 
unmistakably clear that the three categories of conduct comprise the complete 
universe of protected activity . . . .”77  Because some judges have found that the 
phrase “filed any complaint” is plain and clear, they refused to expand the 
reach of the statute.78  Thus, pursuant to a narrow interpretation, only written 
complaints entitle employees to invoke the protection of the Act’s anti-
retaliation clause.79 
II.  LAW, LANGUAGE, AND THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION 
Lawyers, judges, and legislators “have been advised . . . to write plainly, 
sensibly, simply, clearly, succinctly, interestingly, [and] forcibly.”80  
Nonetheless, most would agree that legal language is far from plain, sensible, 
simple, or clear.81  The law’s lack of clarity often inspires legal disputes, and 
disputants often seek judicial intervention.82  “One look at any digest of 
cases . . . brings [about] a conviction of [the law’s] imprecision” and the 
resulting popularity of judicial intervention.83  As such, there must be a reason 
(or several) why legal language is, at times, imprecise.  Part II of this Comment 
explores some of these explanations and addresses the legal and linguistic 
concerns that accompany the interpretation of law. 
 
 77. Id. at 663–64. 
 78. Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 857 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 
494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)) (“The starting point for the interpretation of a statute ‘is the language 
of the statute itself.  Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language 
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’”). 
 79. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The plain language of this 
provision limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a 
proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor.”), overruled 
by Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Minor v. 
Bostwick Labs., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“Further support for the Court’s 
conclusion that the complaint clause does not protect an employee against retaliation for informal, 
intra-company complaints such as Minor’s is found by comparing the circumscribed language 
employed in § 215(a)(3) with Title VII’s considerably broader anti-retaliation provision.”); 
O’Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 665 (quoting Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55) (“‘[T]he plain language of [§ 
215(a)(3) ] limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing complaints, instituting a proceeding, 
or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor.’”). 
 80. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 287–88. 
 81. Id. at 386–87 (explaining that the imprecision of legal language results in a myriad of 
paradoxical questions about its use and development). 
 82. See id. at 387 (the outcome of litigation often “turn[s] repeatedly (and in many 
directions) on the interpretation not of layman’s words but of law words”). 
 83. Id. 
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A. The Limits of Language 
Legal language is imprecise, in part, because language itself is imprecise 
and imperfect.84  Many people, including judges, have recognized the 
shortcomings of language.85  One such shortcoming arises from the “the 
inherent malleability of language.”86  Language is flexible, vulnerable, and 
tolerant, and its natural fluidity and accessibility invite speakers to tweak or 
transform the sound, shape, and meaning of words.87  Having recognized the 
malleability of language, the Third Circuit issued the following admonishment: 
if “regulations [are] to have significance, we must recognize limits on the 
malleability of words.”88  That is to say, because the law is expressed in words, 
and the meaning of words changes over time, the law should not blindly 
uphold such changes.  Additionally, “words do not maintain a strict one-to-one 
relation with the things symbolised [sic].”89  Courts have recognized this 
reality and refer to it as the “one-word-one-meaning . . . fallacy.”90 
Aside from language itself, the legal profession’s adherence to tradition 
may also explain why ambiguity lurks in the law.  In fact, “[m]any of the 
words that lawyers traditionally use never have had any definite meaning.”91  
“Words like reasonable, substantial, satisfactory . . . blatantly flaunt their lack 
of precision.”92  One legal scholar who has recognized the role of tradition in 
legal language opined “[w]ere it not for the fact that they have been used 
repeatedly, traditionally by other lawyers, no lawyer alive would independently 
choose any of these words.”93 
 
 84. Id. at 396–97. 
 85. See supra notes 13–15, 17 and accompanying text. 
 86. Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 698 (2003) (explaining that the 
plaintiff’s construction of the statute at issue “is hardly satisfied by the malleability of the term 
‘maintain”‘); Broderick v. 119TCbay, LLC, 670 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (noting 
that “‘[l]anguage, as compared to mathematics, is inherently imprecise.  Scant few words or 
phrases have one and only one meaning in all climates’”) (citation omitted). 
 87. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text; infra notes 94–97 and accompanying 
text. 
 88. Revak v. Nat’l Mines Corp., 808 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Watson v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 74, 83 (2007) (reasoning that “law depends on respect for language”). 
 89. FREDERICK A. PHILBRICK, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: THE SEMANTICS OF FORENSIC 
ENGLISH 26 (1949). 
 90. R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir. 1952); Irwin v. Simmons, 140 
F.2d 558, 560 (2d Cir. 1944).  Although courts have acknowledged that some words have flexible 
or multiple meanings, courts do not entertain baseless interpretations of legal language; see 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 91. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 301. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 304. 
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A third cause of vagueness in the law relates to society’s use of language.  
Speakers of language, intentionally or unintentionally, effect change through 
use, misuse, and invention.94  Patricia O’Conner, who writes about language 
and grammar, likens the “give-and-take of language” to “warfare.”95  “A word 
bravely soldiers on for years, until one day it falls facedown in the trenches, its 
original meaning a casualty of misuse.  Unique is a good example: a crisp and 
accurate word meaning ‘one of kind,’ now frequently degraded to merely 
‘unusual.’”96  Because language is subservient to its users, “words appear and 
disappear in our lifetime, stress can shift from the second syllable to the first, 
and usage does not remain the same from decade to decade.”97 
In sum, vagueness is endemic to legal language.98  As such, we must ask 
whether vague laws are inimical or desirable.  A host of scholars argue that 
ambiguities in law are necessary and desireable.99  They claim that lawmakers 
deliberately select ambiguous expressions in order to “confer[] discretion on a 
court to formulate an individual norm by choosing from those meanings.”100  
Another argument in favor of imprecise legal language is that laws are 
designed to regulate a range of conduct, and to best effectuate that purpose, 
laws should be abstract.101  Ambiguous expressions, thus, facilitate the 
regulation of “human activity in a general way.”102  Some scholars believe that 
“to pursue precision—or even to avoid significant vagueness” is undesirable 
because “[l]aw, like language, should not make arbitrary, pointless 
distinctions.”103  This line of reasoning ignores the advantages that coincide 
with distinctions, even those perceived as arbitrary.104 
 
 94. See O’CONNER & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at xvii, 43, 153 (explaining how common 
or colloquial use over hundreds of years and the merging of several languages have led to 
ambiguities and multiple meanings for many recognized words). 
 95. PATRICIA T. O’CONNER, WOE IS I: THE GRAMMARPHOBE’S GUIDE TO BETTER ENGLISH 
IN PLAIN ENGLISH 81 (1996). 
 96. Id. 
 97. LIBERMAN, supra note 14, at 157. 
 98. See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text. 
 99. Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, supra note 25, at 379 (“Law is vague because 
precision is not always useful in regulating communities, and lawmakers know that.”); Timothy 
A.O. Endicott, Vagueness and Legal Theory, 3 LEGAL THEORY 37, 63 (1997) (“Whether 
vagueness is a necessary evil or a valuable legal technique, . . . [w]e can go so far as to say that 
vagueness is an essential feature of law.”) [hereinafter Endicott, Vagueness and Legal Theory]; 
Kent Greenawalt, Vagueness and Judicial Responses to Legal Indeterminacy, 7 LEGAL THEORY 
433, 435 (2001) (“The legislature may adopt a vague standard that is to be applied in the first 
instance by an administrative agency.”). 
 100. Endicott, Vagueness and Legal Theory, supra note 99, at 43. 
 101. Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, supra note 25, at 382. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 385. 
 104. Id. at 379–80. 
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The pursuit of precise law yields note-worthy benefits.105  Precise law 
“tells people governed by law where they stand[] and . . . avoids legal 
disputes.”106  When vague laws give rise to legal disputes, litigants expect 
courts to determine the “true” meaning of a word.107  The interpretation of 
legal language unveils a tension between the seemingly fixed nature of law and 
the unfixed nature of language.  To minimize this tension, should courts, when 
engaged in the interpretation of law, be entitled to re-write the law or re-shape 
the English language?  Further, should the judiciary consider a word’s 
common usage and thereby empower language users to re-write the law? 
These questions are raised obliquely by the Kasten case,108 a case that has 
climbed the judicial ranks.  On March 22, 2010, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation.109  By 
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to determine the “true” meaning 
of the word “filed.”110  A year later, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision and defined, for all of America, the scope of the verb “filed.”111  Prior 
to reaching America’s highest court, Kasten was first heard by the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.112  Following a judgment in favor 
of Defendant Saint-Gobain, Plaintiff Kasten appealed.113  Accordingly, the 
case was sent to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for review.114 
B. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation: The Facts 
Plaintiff Kevin Kasten alleged that Defendant Saint-Gobain violated 
Section 215(a)(3) of the Act when Kasten was fired for complaining about the 
location of Defendant’s time clocks.115  Kasten had been an hourly employee 
of Saint-Gobain for approximately three years.116  Hourly employees are 
required to “use a time card to swipe in and out of an on-site Kronos time 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Endicott, Law is Necessarily Vague, supra note 25, at 379. 
 107. PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 34. 
 108. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 837, 838–39 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (construing the meaning of “file” to determine “whether unwritten verbal complaints 
are protected activity”), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 
1325 (2011). 
 109. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.). 
 110. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837 (explaining that the crux of this case is “whether unwritten 
verbal complaints are protected activity”). 
 111. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1325, 1336. 
 112. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 609 (W.D. 
Wis. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 113. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 835. 
 114. Id. at 834. 
 115. Id. at 837. 
 116. Id. at 836. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1294 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1283 
clock.”117  Kasten received a disciplinary warning from Saint-Gobain that 
concerned his use of Saint Gobain’s time clocks.118  The disciplinary warning 
provided, “[i]f the same or any other violation occurs in the subsequent 12-
month period from this date of verbal reminder, a written warning may be 
issued.”119  Roughly six months later, Kasten was issued a written warning 
because of his improper use of Saint Gobain’s time clocks.120  This notice, 
which was signed and acknowledged by Kasten himself, stated, “[i]f the same 
or any other violation occurs in the subsequent 12-month period from this date 
[sic] will result in further disciplinary action up to and including 
termination.”121 
Following the second warning, Kasten received a third warning for his 
failure to clock in and out and a one-day suspension.122  Saint-Gobain notified 
Kasten that if another violation were to occur, additional disciplinary actions 
would be imposed and may include termination.123  Four weeks later, Kasten 
failed to follow the company’s time clock policy, and Saint-Gobain suspended 
him.124  Five days after he was suspended, Kasten was terminated.125 
Kasten claimed that he orally complained to supervisors and human 
resources personnel “about the legality of the location of Saint-Gobain’s time 
clocks.”126  He believed that the placement of the “clocks prevented employees 
from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective 
gear.”127  Kasten insisted that on four separate occasions, he complained about 
the location of the time clocks.128  Saint-Gobain contended that Kasten never 
complained about the location of its time clocks.129 
C. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation: The Analysis 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Saint-Gobain, 
“finding that Kasten had not engaged in protected activity because he had not 
‘filed any complaint’ about the allegedly illegal location of the time clocks.”130  
On review, the Seventh Circuit framed its analysis as a two-part inquiry: “first, 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 837. 
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whether intra-company complaints that are not formally filed with any judicial 
or administrative body are protected activity; and second, whether unwritten 
verbal complaints are protected activity.”131  The second inquiry obliged the 
Seventh Circuit to determine the “true” meaning of the verb “filed.”132 
1. Intra-Corporate Complaints 
The issue of whether internal complaints constitute protected activity under 
the Act’s anti-retaliation provision was one of first impression for the Seventh 
Circuit.133  The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by referencing a 
fundamental precept of statutory interpretation: “Statutory interpretation begins 
with ‘the language of the statute itself [and] [a]bsent a clearly expressed 
legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded 
as conclusive.’”134  The Seventh Circuit held that the Act’s anti-retaliation 
statute protects intra-corporate complaints as evinced by the adjective “any,” 
which modifies the noun, “complaint.”135  The Seventh Circuit, for 
interpretative guidance, engaged in groupthink when it took notice of other 
courts’ conclusions on this issue.136 
2. Unwritten Oral Complaints 
To determine whether unwritten oral complaints constitute protected 
activity—in other words, to define the word “filed”—the Seventh Circuit 
began its analysis by identifying the relevant language of the statute.137  Next, 
the appellate court reviewed the district court’s findings and cited a portion of 
the lower court’s opinion,138 which provided: “By definition, the word ‘file’ 
refers to ‘a collection of papers, records, etc., arranged in a convenient 
order,’ . . . or . . . ‘[t]o deliver (a paper or instrument) to the proper officer so 
that it is received by him to kept [sic] on file, or among the records of his 
office . . . .’”139  Each definition contains direct, explicit references to a paper, 
a writing. 
Plaintiff Kasten urged the Seventh Circuit to adopt a different definition of 
the word “filed.”140  He argued that “filed” has multiple meanings, one of 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 838–40. 
 133. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837. 
 134. Id. at 837–38 (quoting Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 135. Id. at 838. 
 136. Id. (citing opinions from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
circuits). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 838–39. 
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which is “to submit.”141  To assess the validity of Plaintiff’s contention, the 
Seventh Circuit considered the verb’s connotation.142  The court reasoned that 
“[t]he use of the verb ‘to file’ connotes the use of a writing.”143  Next, the 
appellate court considered the word’s denotation and consulted Webster’s 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.144  Webster’s Dictionary defines the verb “to 
file” as: “1.  to arrange in order for preservation and reference <‘file letters’> 
2.  a: to place among official records as prescribed by law <‘file a mortgage’> 
b: to perform the first act of (as a lawsuit) <‘threatened to file charges against 
him’>.”145  The entries in Webster’s Dictionary lent ex post facto support to 
the lower court’s findings and reinforced the Seventh Circuit’s understanding 
of the verb.146 
Plaintiff’s liberal construction of the verb “filed” was rejected first by the 
lower court and again by the Seventh Circuit.147  The lower court refused to 
“simply ignore[] the statute’s use of the word ‘filed,’” and reasoned that 
“[e]xpressing an oral complaint is not the same as filing a complaint.”148  The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s findings and explained that 
Plaintiff’s construction “seem[ed] . . . overbroad.”149  Notwithstanding that 
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit indulged Plaintiff and contextualized his 
proposed definition of “filed.”150  According to the court, “[i]f an individual 
told a friend that she ‘filed a complaint with her employer,’ we doubt the friend 
would understand her to possibly mean that she merely voiced displeasure to a 
supervisor.”151  The Seventh Circuit also considered the “natural 
understanding” of the word and reasoned that the verb “filed” imposes an 
expectation of a writing.152 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the circuit split on this issue.153  In fact, 
the court confronted the split by evaluating the strength of other courts’ 
opinions.154  In response to opinions that conferred a liberal interpretation on 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 839. 
 143. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 613 (W.D. 
Wis. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); 
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839. 
 148. Kasten, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 612–13. 
 149. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839–40. 
 150. Id. at 839. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839–40. 
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Section 215(a)(3), the Seventh Circuit noted that those opinions glossed over 
the presence of the verb “filed” and declined to define it.155 
The Seventh Circuit also compared the language of the Act’s anti-
retaliation provision to analogous federal anti-retaliation statutes.156  This 
analytical exercise convinced the court that a narrow interpretation of the 
phrase “file any complaint” was justified “by the fact that Congress could 
have, but did not, use broader language in the FLSA’s retaliation provision.”157  
Hence, the court concluded that the use of the verb “filed” in place of 
“opposed” limits the scope of protected conduct.158 
The court closed its analysis with a nod to the remedial nature of the Act, 
which “warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions.”159  Rather than 
reading the Act’s animating spirit as a license to expand Section 215(a)(3), the 
Seventh Circuit issued an admonition about conferring a broad interpretation 
of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision: “[E]xpansive interpretation is one thing; 
reading words out of a statute is quite another.”160  The Seventh Circuit, unlike 
other courts, paid homage to the language of the statute and refused to conflate 
the statute’s remedial and humanitarian purpose with the statute’s actual 
language.161 
III.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE INTERPRETATIVE DANCE PERFORMED 
BY COURTS 
“The law has many gaps in which it fails to provide answers for 
judges”162—along with lawyers and American citizens.  These gaps often 
become the subject of litigation.163  In such instances, the task of interpreting 
legal language has been entrusted to the courts.164  To construe statutory text, 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 840. 
 157. Id. 
For example, analogous provisions in other statutes, including Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, forbid employers from retaliating against any 
employee who “has opposed any practice” that is unlawful under the statutes. . . . This 
broader phrase, “opposed any practice,” does not require a “fil[ing],” and has been 
interpreted to protect verbal complaints. 
Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840 (quoting Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th 
Cir.1999)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 838–40. 
 162. Greenawalt, supra note 99, at 437. 
 163. See supra notes 20–22, 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 164. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (1994); 
PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 34. 
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courts seek guidance from an arsenal of analytical tools.165  Courts typically 
consult and apply canons of statutory construction—canons that “set default 
rules to assist in interpretation.”166  However, because canons of interpretation 
establish guidelines rather than rules, “[t]he practice of statutory interpretation 
does not follow any single inquiry.”167  In addition to following the canons, 
judges may decide cases by considering public policy, legislative history, 
community values, or stare decisis.168  Nevertheless, the “canons are 
particularly popular today,” and most courts abide by them.169 
A. Statutory Interpretation in Broad Strokes 
Courts often begin statutory analysis with “the language of the statute 
itself.”170  An examination of the law’s text tends to lead to the application of 
the “plain meaning rule.”171  The “plain meaning rule” calls for an 
interpretation of legislation “on the basis of the wording of the legislation 
itself, without reference to the legislature or the debates that surrounded the 
creation of the legislation, or to any other sources for judgment.”172  The “plain 
meaning rule” encourages courts to consider the absence and presence of every 
word, in part, because no word is to be deemed superfluous.173  In addition to a 
close analysis of the statutory text at issue, courts may refer to the statute’s 
 
 165. For a detailed discussion of the canons of construction upon which courts rely in 
interpreting statutes, see generally YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. 
 166. Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007). 
 167. ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 13. 
 168. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and 
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 656, 661 (1992). 
 169. Id. at 665, 667. 
 170. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“We 
begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a 
statute is the language of the statute itself.  Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the 
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”); KIM, supra note 165, at 2. 
 171. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534. U.S. 438, 450 (2002); KIM, supra note 165, at 2; 
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 320 (1985) 
(“For that rule [the plain meaning rule] urges that the ordinary meaning can be so plain in some 
cases that a court need look to nothing else in carrying out its interpretive task.”). 
 172. JOHN GIBBONS, FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE IN THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (2003). 
 173. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) (reasoning that a 
court is loath to read a statute in a manner that would render part of it superfluous); TRW Inc. v. 
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (“It is a 
‘cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so 
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.’”); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882) (“It is the duty of the court to 
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . .”). 
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other provisions to determine whether the text has a plain meaning.174  Courts, 
rightfully so, decline to read the disputed text in isolation and “consider the 
context in which the statutory words are used.”175  If, upon a close analysis of 
the statutory text, the court concludes that the language is unambiguous, the 
inquiry ceases;176 “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”177  Hence, theoretically, the 
application of the “plain meaning rule,” limits a court’s authority to rewrite 
statutory text. 
If, however, a close textual analysis of statutory text reveals that the text is 
susceptible to different interpretations, courts generally turn to secondary 
sources for answers.178  If the ambiguity is caused by a word, ambiguous words 
“are customarily given their ordinary meanings, often derived from the 
dictionary.”179  Dictionaries are commonly perceived as authoritative 
sources;180 however, their value, in terms of aiding the judiciary with 
interpretive missions, is questionable for several reasons. 
First, dictionary definitions are not always clear.181  Second, most 
dictionaries include multiple entries for each word.182  Third, “dictionaries do 
not settle meanings”;183 they merely reflect common usage.184  In other words, 
definitions are not divined from grammarians or linguists;185 rather, definitions 
 
 174. KIM, supra note 165, at 2. 
 175. Ayes v. U.S. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, 473 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 176. Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450; Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) 
(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (“When the words of a statute are 
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”); KIM, supra 
note 165, at 2 (“[I]f the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the statute 
to its legislative history in order to ascertain the statute’s meaning.”). 
 177. Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 461–62 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253–54); see, e.g., 
United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 103 (1897) (“He is presumed to know the meaning of 
words and the rules of grammar. The courts have no function of legislation, and simply seek to 
ascertain the will of the legislator.”); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. 53, 68 (1810) (“Men use a 
language calculated to express the idea they mean to convey.”). 
 178. See infra notes 179, 193, 195 and accompanying text. 
 179. KIM, supra note 165, at 6; see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“[W]e construe 
a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning” if that term is not defined in 
the statute itself). 
 180. KIM, supra note 165, at 6. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 32. 
 184. O’CONNER  & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at xvii (“People often ask me who decides 
what’s right.  The answer is we all do.  Everybody has a vote.  The ‘rules’ are simply what 
educated speakers generally accept as right or wrong at a given time.  When enough of us decide 
that ‘cool’ can mean ‘hot,’ change happens.”); PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 32 (“Dictionaries 
follow usage; they do not decide or lead it.”). 
 185. O’CONNER  & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at 43. 
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are determined by the American people, the speakers of English.186  Therefore, 
dictionaries do not dictate what is right and wrong; they simply archive 
modern usage.  For example, “[t]he words ‘gantlet’ and ‘gauntlet[]’ . . . have 
become so mixed up in people’s mouths—and minds—that dictionaries now 
say it’s OK to use them interchangeably.”187  One finds this “even when a new 
usage collides with an old established rule.  If enough people break it, the [old] 
rule is dumped.”188  “This is how today’s blunder in . . . meaning may become 
tomorrow’s standard usage.”189  Since “[d]efinitions are fixed by usage,” and 
“[d]ictionaries follow usage[,]”190 courts should view entries in a dictionary as 
linguistic snapshots.  Indeed, Judge Learned Hand cautioned against judicial 
reliance on the dictionary and believed that “it is one of the surest indexes of a 
mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the 
dictionary.”191  Similarly, Justice Stevens warned against the use of 
dictionaries as a panacea for ambiguity in law.192 
In addition to or aside from the dictionary, courts may also seek analytical 
guidance from the law’s legislative history.193  “The legislative history of a 
statute is the history of its consideration and enactment.”194  Further, some 
courts, when analyzing a statute’s legislative history, also consider 
congressional intent.195  However, other courts snub the import of 
congressional intent because “[j]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct 
legislators’ intentions.”196  Those who ignore congressional intent may do so 
because “[t]he search for a subjective and uniform intent motivating the 
hundreds of members of Congress who voted for a statute is . . . almost always 
a chimera” because “legislation is a compromise, the product of alternately 
 
 186. See supra note 184. 
 187. O’CONNER  & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at 153. 
 188. Id. at xvii. 
 189. Id. 
 190. PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 32. 
 191. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added). 
 192. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 113 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In a contest 
between the dictionary and the doctrine of stare decisis, the latter clearly wins.”). 
 193. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative 
history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”); United States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 
154–55 (1932) (“In aid of the process of construction we are at liberty, if the meaning be 
uncertain, to have recourse to the legislative history of the measure and the statements by those in 
charge of it during its consideration by the Congress.”); KIM, supra note 165, at 39–40. 
 194. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 195. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (“Our task is to give effect to the will of 
Congress . . . .”). 
 196. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); accord 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (quoting Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)) (“‘[I]t is ultimately the provisions of 
our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”). 
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opposing and cooperating political forces that may ultimately vote in favor of 
the same bill while harboring diametrically opposite intentions.”197 
When it comes to statutory interpretation or interpretation of any legal 
language, courts are not bound by the canons.  “[C]anons of [statutory] 
construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the 
meaning of legislation . . . .”198  Courts are free to deviate from these 
conventions and “superimpose[] various presumptions favoring particular 
substantive results.”199  Because the canons are “merely axioms of experience” 
and “variables render every problem of statutory construction unique[,]”200 
there is no mandatory approach to statutory interpretation. 
B. Lower Courts’ Interpretations of the Word “Filed” 
Hordes of courts have interpreted the reach of Section 215(a)(3).201  The 
majority of circuits have opted for a liberal construction of the Act’s complaint 
clause.202  However, a minority of circuits held that an expansive interpretation 
is not warranted by the language of the statute.203  In light of the conflicting 
 
 197. In re Kiefer, 276 B.R. 196, 201 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 198. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992); accord Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
115 (2001)) (“For one thing, canons [of statutory interpretation] are not mandatory rules.  They 
are guides that ‘need not be conclusive.’”). 
 199. KIM, supra note 165, at 1; see, e.g., United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by 
James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1934) (considering practical implications when construing 
the word “obscene”).  The Second Circuit was presented with the task of interpreting the word 
“obscene” as used in Section 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 when the Collector seized the novel 
Ulysses, a book penned by Irishman James Joyce.  Id. at 706.  The court’s analysis of the term 
“obscene” was geared toward the practical implications of its interpretation.  Id. at 707.  Judge 
Learned Hand reasoned that “[i]f these [characteristics] are to make the book subject to 
confiscation, by the same test Venus and Adonis, Hamlet, Romeo and Juliet, and the story told in 
the Eighth Book of the Odyssey . . . as well as many other classics, would have to be suppressed.”  
Id. 
 200. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952). 
 201. A search conducted on LexisNexis for court opinions that comment on the scope of 
Section 215(a)(3) returned over 900 matches. 
 202. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that “several circuits” 
have held oral complaints as protected by the Act); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 
43 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e, like many of our sister circuits, conclude that the animating spirit of 
the Act is best served by a construction of § 215(a)(3) under which the filing of a relevant 
complaint with the employer . . . may give rise to a retaliation claim.”); Brock v. Richardson, 812 
F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984); 
Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 203. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled by Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), 
and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 664–
65 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
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jurisprudence, this portion of the article will explore the underpinnings of 
courts’ incompatible conclusions about the meaning of the verb “filed.” 
1. First Circuit 
As a threshold issue, the First Circuit considered whether the language of 
Section 215(a)(3) has a plain meaning.204  The court found that the phrase 
“filed any complaint” was “susceptible to differing interpretations.”205  
However, the First Circuit reasoned that “[t]he strongest case for non-
ambiguity rests perhaps with the verb ‘filed.’”206  The court acknowledged the 
significance of Congress’s use of the word “filed” instead of “making” or 
“voicing.”207  To determine the “true” meaning of the word “filed,” the First 
Circuit sought interpretative guidance from Webster’s Dictionary.208 
The court declined to rule on the scope of Section 215(a)(3).209  
Nevertheless, it reasoned that the inquiry of whether an employee “filed any 
complaint” is fact sensitive and should be decided on a case-by-case basis.210  
The court qualified the word “filed,” explaining that “not all abstract 
grumblings will suffice to constitute the filing of a complaint.”211  Moreover, 
the First Circuit concluded that “‘[t]here is a point at which an employee’s . . . 
comments are too generalized and informal to constitute ‘complaints’ that are 
‘filed’ with an employer within the meaning of the [statute].’”212 
2. Fourth Circuit 
In O’Neill v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., District Judge T.S. Ellis 
began his analysis with the language itself and reasoned that the “provision 
could scarcely be clearer.”213  Consequently, the district court held that the 
anti-retaliation clause is triggered only when an employee engages in conduct 
 
 204. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41.  Valerio v. Putnam Associates, Inc. is the seminal case about the 
scope of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision in the First Circuit and has been cited over 100 times.  
One of its oft-cited holdings is that the Act’s anti-retaliation statute does not require an employee 
to file a complaint with a governmental or administrative agency in order to trigger the 
provision’s protection.  Id. at 45. 
 205. Id. at 41. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 45 (“We conclude, as did the panel in Clean Harbors, that we have 
little choice but to proceed on a case-by-case basis, addressing as a matter of factual analysis 
whether the internal communications to the employer were sufficient to amount to the ‘filing of 
any complaint’ within the statutory definition.”). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 44. 
 212. Id. 
 213. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
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specifically identified by Section 215(a)(3).214  The court explained that 
because the statute does not identify purely oral complaints as protected 
activity, such conduct is not sufficient to trigger the Act’s protection.215 
Next, the court compared the language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision with Section 215(a)(3) of the Act.216  Unlike Section 215(a)(3), the 
court noted, the language of Title VII contains the word “opposed,” and as 
such, has been interpreted expansively.217  The juxtaposition of the anti-
relation clauses of Title VII and the Act convinced the court that “[Congress] 
must be held to have said what it meant.”218  Accordingly, the absence of the 
verb “oppose” and presence of the verb “filed” in Section 215(a)(3) reinforced 
the court’s narrow interpretation.219  Judge Ellis concluded his opinion with an 
ultimatum: “Should Congress, on reflection, consider sound public policy to 
require a different result, it may follow the example of Title VII and amend the 
FLSA to add an ‘opposition clause.’”220 
3. Fifth Circuit 
In 2008, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the scope of Section 215(a)(3).221  
The court began its analysis by reviewing the district court’s findings.222  The 
Fifth Circuit held that purely oral protests constitute protected activity under 
the statute and explained that a broad interpretation of Section 215(a)(3) 
furthers the Act’s goals.223  To temper the court’s expansive interpretation, the 
Fifth Circuit reasoned that an employee’s informal complaint must allege a 
violation of the Act and not merely a “potential illegality.”224 
4. Sixth Circuit 
In EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, the Sixth Circuit spilled minimal 
ink in its interpretation of Section 215(a)(3).225  The court cited an opinion 
from the Third Circuit, which explained: “[A]n informal complaint by an 
employee is sufficient to bring [that] employee under [the] Act; a formal filing 
 
 214. Id. at 664. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. O’Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 664. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 665. 
 221. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 624, 626 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 222. Id. at 624–25 (“[T]he district court found that even an informal, internal complaint could 
constitute protected activity under the FLSA.”). 
 223. Id. at 626. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992). 
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is not necessary.”226  Next, the Sixth Circuit emphasized the temporal sequence 
of events that gave rise to the lawsuit and concluded that because Plaintiff’s 
termination occurred after she “filed” a complaint, Plaintiff had successfully 
presented a prima facie case of retaliation.227 
Judge Suhrheinrich of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the majority’s 
analysis and prepared a dissent.228  His dissent examined the language of 
Section 215(a)(3) and identified three categories of protected conduct.229  
Accordingly, because Plaintiff had failed to engage in one of the three 
enumerated categories of protected conduct, Judge Suhrheinrich concluded that 
Plaintiff had not earned the protection of Section 215(a)(3).230  If Plaintiff had 
brought her action under Title VII, the dissent posited, Plaintiff would have set 
forth a valid claim of retaliation.231  The dissent explained that “Title VII 
expressly includes an opposition clause, which protects employees who protest 
unlawful employment practices”232 whereas “Section 215(a)(3) contains no 
such provision.”233  Judge Suhrheinrich refused to expand the Act’s anti-
retaliation clause and concluded that oral protests do not constitute protected 
activity.234 
5. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with a sampling of circuit courts that 
have interpreted Section 215(a)(3) broadly.235  The Ninth Circuit held that the 
Act’s anti-retaliation is entitled to a broad construction.236  If Section 215(a)(3) 
were applied in a narrow manner, the court reasoned, “such a construction 
would leave employees completely unprotected by the FLSA against 
retaliatory discharge when they complain to their employers about violations 
 
 226. Id. at 989 (citing Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124–25 (3rd Cir. 1987)). 
 227. Id. at 989–90. 
 228. Id. at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 229. Id. (“(1) filed a Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’) complaint, (2) instituted an FLSA 
proceeding, or (3) testified in an FLSA proceeding.”). 
 230. Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 231. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 232. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 233. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 234. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 235. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The First, Third, Sixth, Eight, 
Tenth, and Eleventh circuits have all held that complaints similar to, and even far more ‘informal’ 
than those lodged by the plaintiffs here entitle the employee to coverage under the anti-retaliation 
provision of the FLSA.”). 
 236. Id. at 1004. 
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of the Act.”237  The court’s overriding concern in construing the reach of 
Section 215(a)(3) was to effectuate the goals of the Act.238 
Later in its analysis, the Ninth Circuit commented on the language of the 
statute.239  The court characterized the language as “possibly subject to 
differing interpretations.”240  The circuit court acknowledged the all-inclusive 
language included in Title VII and the absence of similar language in the Act’s 
anti-retaliation provision, but reasoned that the linguistic difference is not 
dispositive.241  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress could 
not be held the meaning of words chosen for Title VII when construing a 
similar provision in the Act.242  To explain away the linguistic discrepancies, 
the court reasoned that the Act, unlike Title VII, was enacted “at a time when 
statutes were far shorter and less detailed, and were written in more general 
and simpler terms.”243 
6. D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by canvassing opinions handed down 
by various circuit courts.244  The D.C. Court explored the consequences of 
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision in both a narrow and broad 
manner.245  In support of a narrow interpretation, the court cited opinions from 
the Second and Fourth Circuits246 and reasoned that “Congress knows how to 
be broad when it wants to be broad.”247  Next, the D.C. Circuit reviewed 
opinions that held that Section 215(a)(3) is entitled to a liberal construction.248  
In doing so, the court identified a common thread: “[M]ost of them note[d] 
important Supreme Court decisions indicating that FLSA [the Act] should not 
be interpreted too narrowly . . . .”249  The D.C. Circuit refrained from defining 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1003–04. 
 239. Id. at 1004–05. 
 240. Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004 (emphasis added). 
 241. Id. at 1005. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. (“The fact that Congress decided to include a more detailed anti-retaliation provision 
more than a generation later, when it drafted Title VII, tells us little about what Congress meant at 
the time it drafted the comparable provision of the FLSA.”). 
 244. Rodriguez v. P.R. Fed. Affairs Admin., 338 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 
435 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Rodriguez, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 130. 
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the reach of Section 215(a)(3), but expressed a preference for a narrow 
construction.250 
C. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Prior to granting certiorari to the Kasten case, the Supreme Court had 
relegated the interpretation of Section 215(a)(3) to the country’s lower 
courts.251  Over the years, however, the Court has issued opinions on other 
provisions of the Act.252  In 1942, the Court agreed to interpret the word 
“wages” in Section 206(a)253 and defined in Section 203(m);254 the issue in that 
case was whether tips could be treated as wages.255  Upon acknowledging the 
word’s statutory definition, the Court assessed the word’s connotation, which it 
extrapolated from the Act’s legislative purpose.256  The Court also considered 
the ordinary meaning of the term “wages” as well as the absence of any 
qualifiers, such as “tip.”257  Had Congress intended the term “wages” to 
include tips, the Court reasoned, by a stroke of the legislative pen, such a 
provision could have been drafted.258  The Court also examined the meaning of 
the word “wages” in other pieces of federal legislation and concluded that it 
lacked a uniform, fixed meaning.259 
In 1949, the Supreme Court defined the word “agriculture” pursuant to its 
inclusion in Section 13(a)(6) of the Act.260  The Court considered the contours 
of the word “agriculture” as understood apart from its use in law.261  Further, 
“the . . . Act provides a carefully considered definition [of the word 
 
 250. Id. at 130–31 (“The narrow holdings of the Second and Fourth Circuits are more 
consistent with FLSA’s language, but we do not know enough to apply that language with 
precision.”). 
 251. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1330 (2011) 
(describing the circuit split regarding protection of oral complaints under section 215(a)(3)). 
 252. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 129 (1988); Tony & Susan Alamo 
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 
361 U.S. 288, 289 (1960); Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 756 
(1949); Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 390 (1942). 
 253. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2006);  Williams, 315 U.S. at 390–91, 391 n.4.  Section 206(a) of the 
Act provides: “Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is 
engaged in commerce . . . wages at the following rates . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 
 254. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); Williams, 315 U.S. at 390–91, 391 n.4. 
 255. Williams, 315 U.S. at 390. 
 256. Id. at 404 (“What the word ‘wages’ connotes in addition to the items specified, we must 
deduce from other provisions of the act in the light of its legislative purpose.”). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 404–07. 
 260. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 756, 757 (1949) (Section 
13(6) exempts persons employed in agriculture from the reach of the Act). 
 261. Id. at 760–62. 
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‘agriculture’],”262 which, the Court noted, “is of substantial aid in helping us to 
make that determination.”263  Although helpful, the definition did not end the 
Court’s inquiry, and the Court sought additional guidance from secondary 
sources.264  However, it “refused to pervert the process of interpretation by 
[seeking assistance from the dictionary and] mechanically applying definitions 
in unintended contexts.”265  Having rejected the dictionary, the Court examined 
the statute’s legislative history.266 
Ten years later, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on an issue that 
implicated Section 215(a)(3) of the Act.267  “The question for decision [wa]s 
whether, in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin violations of 
§ [2]15(a)(3), Section 17 empowers a District Court to order reimbursement 
for loss of wages caused by an unlawful discharge . . . .”268  In that opinion, 
Justice Harlan reasoned the Act’s anti-retaliation clause was designed to 
“foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the 
Act would be enhanced.”269  Specifically, Section 215(a)(3), according to the 
Court, was enacted to insulate employees from economic reprisal if they 
reported an employer’s unlawful employment practices.270 
In 1985, the Supreme Court analyzed Section 203(r) of the Act; at issue 
was the scope of the word “enterprise.”271  The Court observed that in the past, 
the Act had been interpreted broadly in order to effectuate its goals.272  The 
Court also considered the Act’s legislative history, including the effects of the 
Act’s 1961 amendment.273 
Three years later, the Supreme Court construed “the meaning of the word 
‘willful’ as used in [Section 255(a) of the Act].”274  The Court began its 
analysis by examining the statute’s legislative history, which revealed that the 
 
 262. Id. at 762. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. at 763–65, 763 n.10 (examining company by-laws and legislative history to aid in 
defining “agriculture”). 
 265. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 337 U.S. at 764. 
 266. Id. at 764–65. 
 267. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 289 (1960). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 289, 292. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293, 295 (1985) 
(examining Section 203(r) of the Act, which defines the word “enterprise”). 
 272. Id. at 296. 
 273. Id. at 297–98. 
 274. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 129 (1988).  Section 255(a) provides 
for a two-year statute of limitation “if the cause of action accrues on or after [the date of the 
enactment of this Act] . . . except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be 
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006). 
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Act had been amended.275  Accordingly, the Court contemplated the effects of 
Congress’s amendment on the statute’s meaning.276  Another strand of analysis 
involved the Court’s consideration of the ordinary meaning of the word 
“willful.”277  To accomplish this task, guidance was sought from Roget’s 
International Thesaurus.278  The Court concluded that the word “willful,” 
which makes frequent appearances in the law, means that the “employer either 
knew or showed reckless disregard.”279 
Justice Marshall, joined by two other Justices, disagreed with the 
majority’s construction of the word “willful.”280  They agreed that the Court’s 
narrow construction of the Act’s language frustrates the remedial purpose of 
the legislation.281  In reaction to the majority’s use of a thesaurus, Justice 
Marshall argued “the dictionary includes a wide variety of definitions[,]” 
including the “definition urged by the Secretary [Plaintiff].”282 
IV.  THE TENOR OF ORAL ARGUMENTS, THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING, AND 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the Kasten case on October 
13, 2010.283  In total, there were four waves of arguments.  First, on behalf of 
Appellant, Mr. Kaster argued that Section 215(a)(3) is entitled to a broad 
interpretation.284  Next, Jeffrey Wall, Assistant to the Solicitor General, as 
amicus curiae, appeared before the Court in support of Appellant.285  Appellee 
Saint-Gobain’s attorney, Mr. Phillips, urged the Justices of the Court to 
interpret the word “filed” in a narrow manner.286  Mr. Kaster, who reserved 
time for rebuttal, rounded out oral arguments by reiterating his opening 
argument.287 
 
 275. McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 132 (noting that prior to its amendment, Section 255(a) did not 
distinguish between willful and nonwillful violations). 
 276. Id. (reasoning that “Congress intended to draw a significant distinction between ordinary 
violations and willful violations”). 
 277. Id. at 133. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135–36 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 281. Id. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has adopted a definition of ‘willful’ 
that is improperly narrow in light of its effect on the remedial scope of the FLSA.”). 
 282. Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 283. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 
131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (No. 09-834). 
 284. Id. at 3–16. 
 285. Id. at 16–26. 
 286. Id. at 26–50. 
 287. Id. at 50–54. 
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A. Oral Arguments: The Court’s Comments, Questions, and Concerns 
In response to Mr. Kaster’s opening statement, “filing includes an oral 
communication,”288 Justice Alito inquired about the common usage of the verb 
“filed.”289  Similarly, Justice Sotomayor tested Mr. Kaster’s definition of the 
word “filed” by posing a hypothetical.290  The hypothetical revolves around an 
employee who, during a cocktail party, approaches a government employee 
and complains about the employer’s illegal practices.291  After contextualizing 
the word “filed” with a hypothetical, Justice Sotomayor asked Mr. Kaster to 
define the verb “filed.”292  Following Mr. Kaster’s response, Justice Alito 
commented on the word’s ordinary meaning.293  Justice Alito also keyed in on 
a practical implication of construing the word “filed” liberally: absent a 
formality requirement, the issue of whether an employee engaged in protected 
conduct, that is whether an employee’s alleged oral complaints were in fact 
communicated to the employer, will be more readily disputed and 
disputable.294 
Justice Ginsburg brought the Court’s attention back to the language of the 
statute and noted that “every other time the word ‘file’ is used . . . it refers to a 
writing.”295  She urged Mr. Kaster to explain why the Court should adopt an 
interpretation “that deviates from the standard meaning of the term in the very 
Act at issue.”296  After Mr. Kaster’s response, Justice Sotomayor asked Mr. 
Kaster, for a second time, to define the word “filed.”297  Mr. Kaster reiterated 
that “[i]t means to submit or lodge.”298  To assess the merit of Mr. Kaster’s 
definition, Justice Scalia reasoned that if filed means to submit or lodge that 
Mr. Kaster was currently filing a complaint before the Court.299  Scalia, incited 
by such reasoning, remarked: “Now come on, people don’t talk like that. . . .  
 
 288. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 3. 
 289. See id. at 4.  Justice Alito explored the bounds of the verb “filed” with a hypothetical fact 
pattern.  Id.  “Now, there’s—something’s going on in the workplace and the supervisor happens 
to be walking by, maybe a machine is broken, an employee has been hurt, and an employee walks 
up to the supervisor who is walking briskly by, taps the supervisor on the shoulder and says the 
company is violating the Fair Labor Standards Act because of the placement of a clock. . . . 
Would that be the filing of a complaint?”  Id. 
 290. Id. at 4–5. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 5. 
 293. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 6 (“It’s one thing to say that filing 
doesn’t necessarily mean that something is written, although that’s usually what the word means, 
isn’t it?”). 
 294. Id. at 7. 
 295. Id. at 10. 
 296. Id. at 10–11. 
 297. Id. at 12–13. 
 298. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 13. 
 299. Id. 
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That—that—that is absurd.  You are not filing an argument right now.  
Nobody uses the language that way.”300 
Amicus curiae, Mr. Wall, began his argument by paying deference to the 
Court’s pragmatic concerns of according “filed” a liberal interpretation.301  To 
convince the Court that an expansive interpretation is warranted, he explained 
that more than twenty statutes contain analogous language and that the 
majority of those statutes protect all forms of complaints.302  Mr. Wall was 
directed by Justice Scalia to consider the year in which the Act was passed;303  
Justice Scalia also requested Mr. Wall to compare the language of the National 
Labor Relations Act’s anti-retaliation clause with Section 215(a)(3) of the 
Act.304  Following Mr. Wall’s comparison, Justice Ginsburg turned the Court’s 
attention to the practical purpose of a written complaint: “to give the employer 
notice that something is amiss.”305  Justice Kennedy, like Justice Alito, was 
interested in whether a broad interpretation of the Act’s anti-retaliation 
provision would invite litigation.306 
On behalf of Appellee Saint-Gobain, Mr. Phillips commenced his 
argument by describing Appellant’s proposed meaning of Section 215(a)(3) as 
an “inherently unworkable standard.”307  Mr. Phillips conclusion prompted this 
question from the Court: “What makes this worse than these other statutes?”308  
Following Mr. Phillips’s answer, Justice Ginsburg guided the conversation to 
context, but rather than context today, context in 1938, the year the statute was 
enacted.309  Justice Ginsberg also asked Mr. Phillips whether “Congress . . . 
meant that all complaints are okay” in light of the purpose of the Act, which 
was “to protect the workers.”310 
The Court instructed Mr. Phillips to compare the phrase “filed any 
complaint” with similarly-worded provisions in “Title VII, The Age 
Discrimination Act, [and the] Disabilities Act[.]”311  Next, revisiting a concern 
raised earlier in oral arguments by Justice Alito, the Court asked Mr. Phillips to 
comment on the likelihood and frequency of disputes arising over whether an 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 16–17. 
 302. Id. at 16. 
 303. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 17. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 18. 
 306. Id. at 7, 26. 
 307. Id. at 27. 
 308. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 27. 
 309. Id. at 31; Nordlund, supra note 32, at 721 (“[T]he FLSA became effective on October 
24, 1938.”). 
 310. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 31. 
 311. Id. at 34. 
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employee orally protested about a violation of the Act.312  Justice Sotomayor 
requested an explanation as to why the Court should interpret Section 
215(a)(3) narrowly.313  Mr. Phillips explained that the Court should read the 
language of the statute “the way it was written and as the way they would have 
understood it at the time.”314 
B. Interpretative Tools Employed by the Supreme Court During Oral 
Argument 
David Mellinkoff, a scholar who has written on the relationship between 
language and law, has generated a list of questions to determine whether a 
section of “[legal] language is appropriate or inexcusable.”315  The following is 
a sample of his questions: “Is that the only way it [the word at issue] can be 
used? . . .  Did it ever have a definite meaning? . . .  Does it have a definite 
meaning now? . . .  Does this way make meaning more exact than ordinary 
English? . . .  Is there any good reason for saying it this way now?”316  Many of 
the questions posed by the Supreme Court during oral argument are strikingly 
similar to the questions on Mellinkoff’s list.317 
During oral arguments, the Court repeatedly invited both parties to define 
the verb “filed.”318  Justice Sotomayor inquired about the word’s current 
definition, the natural understanding of the word today,319 and Justice Ginsberg 
called for the term’s definition as understood in 1938.320  To further explore 
the scope of the word “filed,” the Court created context by way of 
hypotheticals.321  The Court’s interest in contextualizing the word was far from 
surprising.  After all, “[c]ontext is . . . relevant to determining what comes 
within a given sense of a word as used on a given occasion.”322  Moreover, the 
Court has a history of recognizing the value of context.323  As Justice Homes 
reasoned in 1918, “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is 
 
 312. Id. at 35. 
 313. Id. at 27. 
 314. Id. 
 315. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 297–98 (“Is it a term of art? . . .  Are its edges sharp or 
soft? . . .  Is that the only way it can be used? . . .  Is this the traditional way of saying it? . . .  
Does this way make meaning more exact than ordinary English? . . .  Is there some requirement 
that it be said this way?”). 
 316. Id. at 298. 
 317. Compare MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 298, with Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 283, at 11–13. 
 318. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 5, 12–13. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 31. 
 321. See, e.g., id. at 4–5, 7, 15–16, 20, 23, 28. 
 322. JIM EVANS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION 22 (2d ed. 
1989). 
 323. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
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the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”324 
The Justices also inquired about the practical effects of each party’s 
construction of Section 215(a)(3)325 and whether such a definition aligns with 
the Act’s goals and legislative history.326  Additionally, the Court’s questions, 
on multiple occasions, required litigants to compare the language of Section 
215(a)(3) with analogous anti-retaliation provisions.327  Notwithstanding the 
questions concerning the Act’s goals and legislative history, the Court seemed 
most concerned with developing a workable and fitting definition of the word 
“filed.”328 
C. The Supreme Court’s Ruling 
In an opinion penned by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court began its 
analysis of the phrase “filed any complaint” with the text of the statute.329  
However, the Court veered from the statute itself and devoted its attention to 
the meaning of the verb “filed.”330  Prior to fleshing out its analysis, the 
Court’s opinion reports that “[t]he word ‘filed’ has different relevant meanings 
in different contexts.”331  In a single sentence, the Court paid homage to a 
fundamental truth: although we share a common language, one language, that 
language creates many realities.332  To ferret out the definition of the word 
“filed,” the Court consulted three separate dictionaries.333  Two of the 
dictionaries include a definition that contemplates a writing.334  The second 
entry in the third dictionary states that “to file is to ‘present in the regular way, 
as to a judicial or legislative body, so that it shall go upon the records or into 
the order of business.’”335  According to the Court, that definition “permit[s] 
the use of the word ‘file’ in conjunction with oral material[,]”336 which “is 
significant because it means that dictionary meanings, even if considered 
 
 324. Id. (emphasis added). 
 325. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 7, 35. 
 326. Id. at 31, 36, 42–43. 
 327. Id. at 10, 27, 34. 
 328. Id. at 4–5, 6, 7, 11–13, 31, 40–41. 
 329. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1329, 1331 (2011). 
 330. Id. at 1331. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See id. 
 333. Id. (using WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, and FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE to define the word “file”). 
 334. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331. 
 335. Id. (quoting 1 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 920 (Isaac K. Funk ed., 1938)). 
 336. Id. 
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alone, do not necessarily limit the scope of the statutory phrase to written 
complaints.”337 
To buttress the validity of the Court’s construction of the verb “file,” first, 
the Court noted that “legislators, administrators, and judges have all sometimes 
used the word ‘file’ in conjunction with oral statements.”338  Second, the Court 
cited a list of federal regulations, which were promulgated by federal agencies, 
that “sometimes permit complaints to be filed orally.”339  Next, the Court 
referenced a handful of court opinions where the parties’ dispute concerned or 
arose from an oral complaint.340  Yet, the following sentence of the opinion 
included a curious confession: most complaints are made in writing.341  To 
temper this concession, the Court reframed its inquiry: “[W]e are interested in 
the filing of ‘any complaint[,]’” not just the filing of a complaint.342  By 
tweaking its approach, the Court reasoned that while the verb “‘filed’ . . . 
might suggest a narrow interpretation limited to writings, the phrase ‘any 
complaint’ suggests a broad interpretation that would include an oral 
complaint.”343 
About halfway through the opinion, the Court shifted its gaze back to the 
language of Section 215(a)(3) and considered “other appearances of the word 
‘filed’ in the Act.”344  Although the verb “filed” populates the text of the Act, 
the Court concluded that “its appearance elsewhere in the Act does not resolve 
the linguistic question before us.”345  Having parsed the language of the Act to 
its satiety, the Court considered other anti-retaliation provisions, but noted that 
they use different language, broader language.346  To reconcile this, the Court 
proposed two irreconcilable explanations: “[T]he use of broader language 
elsewhere may mean (1) that Congress wanted to limit the scope of the phrase 
before us to writings, or (2) that Congress did not believe the different 
phraseology made a significant difference in this respect.”347  The Court then 
stated that the statutory text fails to conclusively answer this question, so it 
turned to functional considerations.348 
First, the Court addressed the practical effects of according Section 
215(a)(3) a narrow interpretation and explained that such an interpretation 
 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. (emphasis added). 
 339. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331 (emphasis added). 
 340. Id. at 1332. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1332. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 1332–33. 
 347. Id. at 1333. 
 348. Id. 
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“would undermine the Act’s basic objectives.”349  The Court also posed a 
rhetorical question: “Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement 
scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s complaint procedure by 
those who would find it difficult to reduce their complaints to writing . . . ?”350  
Next, the Court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of Section 215(a)(3) 
would “take needed flexibility from those charged with the Act’s 
enforcement.”351  Although the Act seeks to protect employees from a 
spectrum of unsavory employment practices, the Court admitted that the Act 
also seeks to create a statutory scheme that is fair to employers.352  To be fair 
to employers, the Court reasoned, “the employer must have fair notice that an 
employee is making a complaint that could subject the employer to a later 
claim of retaliation.”353 
Returning to the statutory text, the Court stated that the phrase “filed any 
complaint” denotes a certain degree of formality.354  However, the degree of 
formality, according to the Supreme Court, “does not necessarily mean that 
notice must be in writing.”355  As such, Section 215(a)(3) is triggered when a 
complaint is “sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to 
understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights 
protected by the statute and a call for their protection.”356  This standard can be 
satisfied by both oral and written complaints.357 
D. Commentary on the Judiciary’s Interpretations of Section 215(a)(3) 
To interpret the Act’s anti-retaliation provision, many, if not most, lower 
courts concentrated on the Act’s animating spirit and reasoned that the scope 
of Section 215(a)(3) should extend beyond the activities explicitly identified 
by the statutory text.358  While the underlying current of a law is important, at 
what point “does an interpretation become so outrageous that it [should] be 
condemned as an invention?”359  Courts should be wary of magnifying the 
importance of the Act’s remedial and humanitarian purpose.  A statute’s 
 
 349. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1333. (reasoning that the Act proscribes certain employment 
practices and does so by relying on information and complaints from employees). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 1334. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1334. 
 355. Id. at 1335. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 
F.3d 35, 42–44 (1st Cir. 1999); Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1548–49 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 359. TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 180 (2000). 
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purpose is not a license to expand the scope of its provisions.  It is imprudent 
for courts to add words to a statute that Congress has clearly excluded.  Had 
Congress desired to extend the reach of Section 215(a)(3), it could have done 
so with an amendment. 
Some lower courts, like the Seventh Circuit, consulted the dictionary for 
analytical guidance.360  Mr. Kaster, on behalf of Appellant Kasten, argued that 
the word “filed” is synonymous with the word “submitted.”361  If, as Mr. 
Kaster claimed, the word “filed” can also mean “submitted,” the mere 
possibility that a word can mean one thing does not warrant the expansion of a 
piece of federal legislation.362  If courts desire to supplement their analysis by 
referring to the dictionary, perhaps they should consult a dictionary whose 
copyright corresponds with the year of the Act’s enactment.  Alternatively, 
courts could consult a dictionary of etymology.363  A dictionary of etymology 
or, in this case, a dictionary from the 1940’s would accurately inform the court 
of the origins of the word “filed” or how the word “filed” was conceptualized 
by those who wrote the statutory text. 
Although the Supreme Court ignored the etymology of the verb “filed,” it 
sought analytical guidance from three dictionaries, two of which were 
published in the 1930’s.364  Two definitions, which were pulled from two 
discrete dictionaries, indicate that the word “filed” contemplates a writing.365  
However, those definitions appeared to displease the Court.  As such, it 
scouted for a dictionary entry that cast a wider net.366  The Court found such a 
definition.367  The more inclusive definition—to file means to “‘present in the 
regular way, as to a judicial or legislative body, so that it shall go upon the 
 
 360. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Kasten v. 
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 613 (W.D. Wis. 2008), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Valerio v. Putnam 
Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 361. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838–39; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 11. 
 362. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839. 
 363. See, e.g., THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 381 (Robert K. Barnhard & Sol 
Steinmetz eds., 1988) (The verb “filed” is defined as “to place (papers, etc.) in order.”).  THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY defines the verb “file” as: “place on or in a file.”  
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 355 (C. T. Onions et al. eds., 1966). 
 364. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (2011) (The 
Court cited WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, which was published in 1934, 
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY whose copyright is 1983, and FUNK & 
WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, which was published in 
1938.). 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
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records’”368—lent a modicum of credibility to the Court’s next deduction, 
which mirrored Plaintiff Kasten’s argument: when a word might have another 
meaning, that meaning is just as forceful as the word’s ordinary or principal 
meaning.369  The Court characterized this possibility, that a word has dual 
meanings, as significant and concluded that because the definitions of “filed” 
lacked uniformity, the scope of the word is ambiguous.370 
However, the court failed to examine the meaning of the third definition.  
The third definition places limits as to when filing constitutes presenting in the 
regular way.371  Those limits require an individual to speak before a judicial or 
legislative body.372  In this case, Plaintiff Kasten orally complained to his 
employer, not a judicial or legislative body.373  Further, prior to invoking the 
Act’s anti-retaliation provision, he had not presented his complaint to a judicial 
or legislative body.374  Nonetheless, this definition alone was sufficient to 
convince the Court that the word “filed” could encompass oral and written 
complaints.375  Moreover, this third definition requires the individual’s 
statement to “‘go upon the records or into the order of business.’”376  The 
phrase “go upon the records” is clear; however, the neighboring phrase “into 
the order of business” is far less clear.  Rather than consider whether the third 
definition applies to the Kasten case, the Court presumed that it did and forged 
ahead with its analysis.377  However, had the Court parsed the language of this 
definition, its analysis might have been different. 
Aside from the possibility that the word “filed” includes oral statements, 
the Court noted that “legislators, administrators, and judges have all sometimes 
used the word ‘file’ in conjunction with oral statements.”378  The adjective 
“sometimes” denotes a lack of agreement, an inconsistency.  Had the Court 
selected a measure other than sometimes, such as frequently or regularly, this 
anecdotal data would carry more force.  Also, it would be helpful to know 
 
 368. Id. (quoting 1 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 920 (Isaac K. Funk ed., 1938)). 
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what year and under what circumstances these legislators, administrators, and 
judges used the word “file” as a synonym for presenting an oral statement. 
E. The Intersection of Language and Law 
In light of the relationship between law and language, a series of connected 
considerations materialize when courts are asked to interpret the law.  First, 
we, as speakers of the English language, wield the power to control the 
meaning of words.  Accordingly, because dictionaries reflect common usage 
and yesterday’s blunder becomes tomorrow’s standard usage,379 we should ask 
whether common usage is an appropriate standard upon which to judge a word.  
Further, by virtue of our control over language, does it follow that we, the 
American people, control the law? 
Second, when a court hands down an opinion that defines the “true” 
meaning of a word, that decision may shape common usage and thereby 
sharpen or blur the definition of a word.  If the definition of a word has been 
expanded by the judiciary, are courts entitled to commit verbicide with 
impunity?380  Verbicide occurs when a person or entity “injur[es] the 
language . . . both by helping to break down a serviceable distinction, and by 
giving currency to a mere token word in place of one that is alive.”381  If the 
judiciary is empowered to define words, we should also ask whether judges 
make good linguists.382 
Third, because language is not static, how can courts, together with the 
American people, counteract the instability of language and by extension, the 
instability of law?  As our first line of defense, we should recognize that “bad 
language usage can hurt good law; good language usage can promote respect 
for good law.”383  Accordingly, the pursuit of stability in language and law is 
mutually inclusive.  As a society, we control language, and to some extent, 
law.  Therefore, although “language cannot stand still, the main thing for the 
public interest is that alterations in vocabulary . . . should not become too 
rapid, reckless, and wanton.”384 
The American people and the court system should be wary of condoning 
injudicious interpretations of words.  For language to serve its purpose, words 
must signify clear, precise concepts; they must be distinguishable and distinct.  
The preservation of language will engender stability in law.  A stable language 
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will “enhance[] predictability in the application of law and, hence, liberty.”385  
Further, linguistic stability together with precision in law may “reduce[] doubt 
and disagreement.”386  The law will be more accessible to American citizens, 
and consequently, the need for judicial intervention might decline.387 
CONCLUSION 
“The paradox of language is that it changes fast and radically, without our 
noticing it.”388  Despite the ever-changing nature of language, “this language 
has preserved a body of law, given it continuity from backwater beginnings to 
world eminence.”389  Given the law’s dependency on language and language’s 
malleability, a conflict of interest crystallizes between the two: If language, an 
essential ingredient of law, is malleable and ever-changing, how can law 
endure and retain clarity? 
This interdisciplinary inquiry inspired by Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp. is the subject of a circuit split, which has now 
been resolved by the Supreme Court.390  The substantive issue presented by 
this case is whether purely oral complaints constitute filing a complaint and are 
sufficient to trigger the Act’s protection.391  To determine the reach of the 
Act’s anti-retaliation provision, the Supreme Court has identified the “true” 
meaning of the word “filed.”392  In doing so, how did the Court reach a 
decision, and what does its decision indicate about the relation between 
language and law?  This case and the Court’s opinion prompts a litany of 
linguistic and legal queries, such as whether law should evolve with language; 
whether the meaning of legal language should correspond with speakers’ 
everyday use; and whether Americans and the judiciary should band together 
to preserve and honor language by preserving and honoring law. 
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